Behavioral Economics in Provider Incentive Design

The key goal of this project is to demonstrate how using behavioral economic principles to inform the structure of provider incentives and the practice environment can improve provider performance, especially in settings that are moving away from fee-for-service reimbursement and fragmented care towards new payment and delivery models that emphasize coordination of care and provider accountability. The project will build upon the recently completed 'Phase 1' project in which a set of behavioral economic approaches to provider performance were identified that could meaningfully improve provider performance, a focused research agenda of high-priority tests of these concepts (i.e., content of this proposal) was developed; and information on how behavioral economics can be used to improve incentives for physicians was disseminated. For this phase, an experimental evaluation will be conducted of the impact of social pressure by varying individual and group incentives and the comparative effectiveness of two loss aversion framing methods (endowment versus performance gap) on provider performance via a multi-arm experiment. We will complement the quantitative evaluations with pre- and post-intervention qualitative surveys of physicians and patients to better understand the influence on behavior change, culture, acceptability of the incentive program, and patient reported outcomes on health and experience.

Inclusion criteria

• Physician at participating provider organization (PCP and specific specialties)

Exclusion criteria

• N/A